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Abstract 
Inspired by a debate between Andeweg (2001) and Lijphart (2001) on the pros and cons of 
consensus democracy, this study explores the impact of institutional arrangements on the 
performance of populist parties in Western Europe from 1980 to 2017. ‘Populism’ is 
conceptualized in terms of its emphasis on the antagonism between the people and corrupt 
elites, and its opposition to intermediary structures between the rulers and the ruled. This study 
considers both right-wing as well as left-wing populist parties. Two hypotheses are formulated 
based on the debate between Andeweg (2001) and Lijphart (2001). First, countries that are more 
consensual on the executive-parties dimension show higher support for populist parties. 
Second, countries that have more open electoral systems show higher support for populist 
parties. I examine that there is not one simple answer. Each hypothesis has explanatory value 
for each respective side of the populist spectrum. Hence, there seems to be a gap in studying 
populism as such. This study strongly indicates that left-wing and right-wing populism may 
have very different explanations for their relative success. Whereas the first hypothesis seems 
to be a strong predictor of support for right-wing populist parties, the second hypothesis seems 
to be a robust predictor of support for left-wing populist parties. 
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Introduction 
Leading scholars have linked the rise of populism in Western Europe to the malfunctioning of 
contemporary democracy. Populism is referred to as ‘accompanying democracy like a shadow’ 
(Canovan, 1999, 16). Or elsewhere, as ‘a fever warning’ which signals that problems are not 
effectively dealt with and points to ‘the malfunctioning of the linkage between citizens and 
governing elites’ (Mény & Surel, 2002, 15). In other words, if everything was well in 
contemporary democracies, populist parties would not have attracted such widespread support 
in past decades. 
This study sets out to explore the impact of institutional arrangements on the 
performance of populist parties. Since ‘the likelihood that populism is driven by the institutional 
makeup of democracies has seldom been systematically explored, let alone empirically tested’ 
(Papadopoulos, 2002, 47). The ambition of this study is to explain the size of populist parties 
in eighteen Western European countries from 1980 to 20171. Moreover, although populism 
manifested itself on both sides of the political spectrum, studies on populism have mainly 
focused on right-wing populism. Some scholars have started to address this inconsistency 
(March & Mudde, 2005; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). 
Furthermore, scholars have recently indicated that left-wing and right-wing populism may be 
different phenomena that have very different explanations for their relative success (Gidron & 
Mijs, 2019). Hence, this study will include both left-wing as well as right-wing populist parties.  
This research maintains that the social and economic breeding ground for populist 
parties is relatively similar across Western European countries, and will explore what main 
institutional factor or which factors explain its relative success. The study is based on an 
academic debate which suggest two respective explanations. On the one hand, this study 
elaborates on theory from Andeweg (2001) that is tested by Hakhverdian and Koop (2007). The 
theory is based on two distinct models of democracy that Lijphart (1999) famously identified: 
the majoritarian and the consensus model. Kakhverdian and Koop (2007) assess that consensus 
democracies show higher support for populist parties, because their inherent political cultures 
of elite cooperation leads to a lack of genuine opposition. The lack of political opposition within 
such democracies is consequently theorized to lead to populist upsurge, as populist parties often 
appeal against the “cozy” arrangements that exist between established political parties. 
(Andeweg, 2001; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007). However, Arend Lijphart provides a different 
                                                            
1 These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (West-) Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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explanation for the way consensus democracies provide fertile ground for populist parties: ‘I 
think it is not so much the dissatisfaction with the absence of competition among the major 
parties that feeds these right-wing parties as the chance that proportional representation offers 
them to get elected’ (Lijphart, 2001, 135). 
The contradictions in this debate leave us with a fundamental question whether the 
political culture or the intrinsic electoral system of consensus democracy can explain the size 
of populist parties. Moreover, scholars already pointed out that ‘future studies might elaborate 
on the impact of separate institutions, such as electoral systems’  (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007, 
418). This study contributes to the existing literature on populism by doing exactly that. If 
populism is indeed a ‘fever warning’ which signals the malfunctioning of representative 
democracy, then identifying the main cause of support for such parties is crucial (Mény & Surel, 
2002, 15). Altogether, the research question of this study is: “What explains the size of populist 
parties in Western European countries?”. 
 Two falsifiable hypotheses will be formulated based on the debate between Andeweg 
(2001) and Lijphart (2001). The first hypothesis is that countries that are more consensual on 
the executives-parties dimension show higher support for populist parties. Henceforward, the 
second hypothesis states that countries that have more open electoral systems will have larger 
populist parties. The goal of this study is to contrast both hypotheses in order to conclude which 
is a better predictor of the size of populism in Western European countries. 
 Since there is no comprehensive study on how electoral systems affect populism in 
specific, I will first conduct a qualitative deviant-case analysis. Consequently, it is expected 
that the case will provide insight into a larger population. Ideally, we need a case in which a 
country drastically changed its electoral system in order to contrast how this affects populist 
support. France provides the most vivid example, because it changed its electoral system from 
majority-plurality to proportional representation in 1986. Consequently, I will study support for 
populist parties in the periods before (1981 to 1986) and after the electoral system was changed 
(1986 to 1988). 
 Thereinafter, the findings of the research will be generalized in a cross-national 
quantitative analysis. Here, both the first and second hypotheses are tested to identify what best 
explains the size of populist parties in Western Europe from 1980 to 2017. 
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Populism and its features 
Crucial to studying populism is a conceptualization of the phenomenon. Hence, scholars of 
populism have always had more problems defining populism than determining which parties 
are populist in nature (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007). This study operationalizes populism 
according to a definition of Cas Mudde (2004). He defines populism as a political ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: 
‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’. Populist ideology argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. Populists claim to speak in the 
name of the moral people in an attempt to make these people conscious of the antagonism 
between them and the corrupt elites. However, populist do not aim at educating the people or 
changing their values or way of life (Mudde, 2004). 
Nonetheless, we need to be careful not to confuse populism with often related terms, 
such as anti-system opposition, nativism and Euroscepticism. Conceptual clarity is crucial, as 
for example political parties can be anti-system parties, without being populist (like the NSDAP 
in Germany) (Rooduijn, 2018). Furthermore, parties can be populist, yet not anti-system (like 
Forza Italia in Italy, which participated in multiple governing coalitions). Moreover, whereas 
populism concerns the vertical relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, nativism is 
about the horizontal antagonism between ‘the nation’ and ‘dangerous others’. Last, 
Euroscepticism can be part of a populist parties stances, but is not necessarily the case 
(Rooduijn, 2018). On basis of Mudde’s conceptualization, a list of Western European populist 
parties can be drawn up.  
 
Figure 1. 
Austria FPÖ Iceland M 
Austria TS Iceland FIF 
Austria BZÖ Iceland B-H 
Austria Martin Ireland SF 
Belgium VB Italy PdL 
Belgium LDD Italy LN 
Belgium FN Italy M5S 
Denmark FrP Italy FdI 
Finland Ps Luxembourg ADR 
Finland SIN Netherlands PVV 
France FN Netherlands SP 
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Germany Linke Netherlands LPF 
Germany AfD Norway FrP 
Greece SYRIZA Spain Podemos 
Greece ANEL Switzerland SVP 
Greece LAOS United Kingdom UKIP 
Note: Portugal does not have a populist party. 
 
 
Theories on the size of populist parties. 
The goal of this study is to shed new light on recent academic debate which suggests that 
populist support is traceable to the institutional framework of democracies. Clear patterns in 
the institutional setup of democracies allowed Lijphart (1999) to identify two main models of 
democracy, that are being discussed first. Second, I will discuss theory on how political elite 
behavior should be contingent on whether the primary distinction in society is between social 
segments, or between elite and mass. Consequently, Andeweg (2001) and Hakhverdian and 
Koop (2007) suggest that a cooperating style of elite behavior in culturally homogeneous 
societies may lead to the rise of populism. In the third part, I will criticize this theory and 
construct a dynamic explanatory framework that may explain how populism emerges over time. 
Moreover, I will formulate two hypothesis on the basis of both theories. 
 
Two Patterns of Democracy. 
Democracies come in different shapes and sizes. In his famous study on patterns of democracy, 
Arend Lijphart (1999) identifies two distinct models of democracy: the majoritarian 
(Westminster) model and the consensus model. The contrast between the models arises from 
the most basic and literal definition of democracy: ‘government by and for the people’ (Lijphart, 
1999). This raises a fundamental question of who will do the governing and to whose interest 
the government should be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have different 
preferences (Lijphart, 1999). One answer to this dilemma is: the majority of the people. This is 
the crux of the majoritarian model of democracy of which the United Kingdom can be seen as 
an example. The alternative answer to the dilemma is: as many people as possible. This is the 
essence of the consensus model, of which the Netherlands serves as an example (Lijphart, 
1999). 
Lijphart then goes on to identify ten differences with regard to the most important 
democratic institutions and rules that can be drawn from the majoritarian and consensus 
principles. These ten variables can be grouped into two separate dimensions: the executive-
parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart, 1999). Lijphart’s first dimension 
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measures the division of power within institutions, whereas the second dimension, measures 
the division of power between institutions. The first dimension will serve as an independent 
variable, because this study aims to explain how arrangements within institutions affect support 
for populism. Therefore, I will decompose the five indicators of Lijphart’s first dimension 
before we continue. The five indicators of the executive-parties dimension are in figure 2. This 
study will apply the conceptualization and operationalization of Lijphart’s (1999) work. 
 
Figure 2: Lijphart’s (1999) executive-parties dimension. 
Effective number of parliamentary parties 
Minimal winning one-party cabinets 
Executive dominance 
Electoral disproportionality 
Interest group pluralism 
 
 
The political culture of the consensus model of democracy. 
Any democracy balances an ambiguous mixture of inclusiveness and accountability (Andeweg, 
2001). Whereas inclusiveness refers to the proportion of a population that is entitled to 
participate in public contestation, accountability refers to the extent to which political parties 
can be held accountable by voters on elections. Relative emphasis on one of these 
characteristics should be contingent on whether the primary distinction in society is between 
social segments, or between elite and mass (Andeweg, 2001). The first case requires an 
inclusive democratic government in which elites cooperate in order to incorporate the interests 
of each social segment. The second case requires elites to compete on political stances in order 
to provide voters clear policy options, which increases elite accountability. Consensus 
democracy, which is characterized by institutions that broaden the involvement in decision 
making score high on inclusiveness. Majoritarian democracy, which is based on the idea of 
majority rule, scores high on accountability because the system should provide clear political 
alternatives. 
However, scholars observed the erosion of social cleavages in Western European 
societies. Although this reduced the need for elite cooperation in consensus democracy to 
safeguard democratic stability, we witnessed a trend towards more elite cooperation and a 
convergence of party programs (Andeweg, 2001; Katz & Mair, 1995). This phenomenon is 
characterized as ‘depoliticized democracy’. Consequently, elite cooperation in depoliticized 
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democracy would come at the expense of political accountability, as political parties fail to 
provide clear policy alternatives (Andeweg, 2001). Henceforward, a lack of political 
accountability may feed anti-elite opposition. Theory consequently suggests that this 
depoliticized form of democracy leads to the emergence of populism, as populist parties act 
against the ‘cozy arrangements’ of the ‘corrupt elites’ and they oppose the intermediary 
structures between elites and the people (Andeweg, 2001; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007).  
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) studied whether the political culture of consensus 
democracy indeed leads to the rise of populism. They considered both left-wing as well as right-
wing populism. They indeed show that countries that are consensual are more likely to have 
large populist parties. Hence, their assessment that the political culture of consensus democracy 
is associated with support for populism raises important questions. Hakhverdian and Koop 
(2007, 404) note that ‘since institutions are quasi-constant variables, our approach does not 
account for the fact that the electoral fortunes of one and the same populist party may differ 
over time’. However, my argument is that  electoral systems do make a difference in explaining 
the success of populist parties. After all, leading scholars showed that the electoral system often 
is related to a party system (Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1982; Lijphart, 1999). Whereas two-party 
systems typify the majoritarian model of democracy, the consensus model is characterized by 
a multiparty system. Accordingly, Lijphart’s response to the assertion that consensus 
democracy provide fertile ground for populist parties was: ‘I think it is not so much the 
dissatisfaction with the absence of competition among the major parties that feeds these right-
wing parties as the chance that proportional representation offers them to get elected’ (Lijphart, 
2001). To put it differently, Lijphart suggests that (right-wing) populist parties emerge like 
other parties: more open electoral systems offers them a bigger chance to get elected. It is this 
debate that is subject of this study, because it leaves us a fundamental question whether it is the 
political culture or the electoral system of consensus democracy that explains the size of 
populist parties. 
 
Two hypotheses 
Figure 3: Independent and control variables of this study. 
 Related to populist parties Related to any political party 
Dynamic Unemployment, Immigration Electoral volatility 
Not dynamic Political culture of consensus democracy Average district magnitude 
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Drawing on this debate we can formulate two hypotheses. The first hypothesis reads as follows: 
Countries that are more consensual on the executive-parties dimension show higher support 
for populist parties than countries that are more majoritarian. The second hypothesis needs 
further explanation. As the institutional design of a country is a semi-constant variable, it often 
does not change that much over time (Lijphart, 1999). Therefore, the assertion that the political 
culture of consensus democracy leads to the rise of populism is rather curious, because this does 
not explain how populist parties are able to manifest themselves over time. In other words, the 
political culture of depoliticized politics in consensus democracy was continuous, hence all of 
a sudden we witnessed the emergence of populist parties in past decades (Rooduijn & 
Akkerman, 2017). Hakhverdian and Koop’s approach thus would suggest that populist parties 
are always large in depoliticized democracies, while figures clearly show that this is not the 
case (Golder & Bormann, 2013). This thus leaves a gap in our understanding of the rise of 
populism. If we want to understand how populist support fluctuates over time, we need a 
dynamic explanatory framework. 
The framework comprises the following. First, average district magnitude serves as a 
quasi-constant independent variable whereas electoral volatility presents a dynamic control 
variable. Both are related to the emergence of political parties in general. Moreover, 
unemployment and immigration rates serve as dynamic control variables that may explain the 
size of populism over time. Figure 3 shows a two-by-two table which comprises a 
categorization of all five (control) variables. Altogether, this leads us to the second hypothesis 
which reads as follows: Countries that have more open electoral systems show higher support 
for populist parties than countries that have more closed electoral systems. 
As noted earlier,  the consensus model of democracy is typified by a multi-party system 
(Lijphart, 1999). This is mainly due to the openness of its electoral system. Electoral systems 
determine how vote shares are being transmitted into seat shares in parliament. The proportional 
representation electoral system, which is part of the executive-parties dimension, allows for a 
multi-party system. Consequently, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007), consider proportionality to 
be a good indicator of electoral openness. The logic is that political parties can enter parliament 
more easily in proportional electoral systems. 
However, literature shows that the logged measurement of average district magnitude is 
a better parameter of electoral openness (Lowery et. al., 2010). While proportionality is an 
indicator of how vote percentages are translated to seat percentages in parliament, this indicator 
does not sufficiently reflect the actual openness of an electoral system. Countries differ in their 
number of electoral districts, which translates votes of each districts into seats in parliament. 
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Hence, variations in district sizes creates different natural thresholds for each separate district. 
Consequently, new parties will have more difficulty entering one district over another. 
Therefore, the logged measurement of average district magnitude is a better parameter of 
electoral openness. Moreover, it effectively accounts for outliers, such as the 150-member 
district of the Netherlands (Lowery et. al., 2010). However, this leaves the question what 
explains the emergence of (new) parties over time, because they need an electorate that supports 
them. In other words, we need a dynamic variable that explains when parties will find support. 
 
Electoral volatility 
The availability of an electorate for (new) parties can be measured by looking at a country’s 
electoral volatility. Electoral volatility measures to what extent voters change their vote in 
consequent elections. Lago and Martínez (2011) assert that a combination of low voter turnout 
and high electoral volatility on previous elections can predict the emergence of (new) parties. 
An in-depth analysis of how this phenomenon works is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the theory is founded on the idea that the emergence of (new) parties requires a 
significant number of voters to change their behavior in a coordinated fashion. Low voter 
turnout is often related to voters dissatisfaction with contemporary parties. If voters do not 
support established parties, they are more likely not to vote. Lago and Martínez (2011) refer to 
this phenomenon as political market failure. Dissatisfied voters are more likely to change their 
vote to new parties that do support their political ideas. Therefore high voter volatility in 
combination with low turnout rates is theorized to allow for (new) parties to emerge in 
following elections. However, literature shows that voter turnout is not an accurate explanatory 
since in countries such as Belgium voting is compulsory, which will distort accurate 
measurements (Malkopoulou, 2009). Moreover, electoral volatility and voter turnout are merely 
two sides of the same coin as both indicators measure voter (dis)satisfaction with contemporary 
politics. Hence, only electoral volatility will serve as an independent control variable in this 
study. 
 
Unemployment and immigration 
Finally, literature on populism suggests two main factors that drive support for respectively the 
populist right and left. As both are dynamic variables, they help explain the success of populist 
parties over time. First, increased unemployment rates can drive voters dissatisfaction with 
mainstream parties (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). Unemployment can increase people’s support for 
redistribution, which is a key issue for the populist left’s agenda. High unemployment rates 
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consequently would bode well for left-wing populist support.  However, scholars show that 
populist parties on both sides of the political spectrum use voter dissatisfaction, ever attempting 
to make people conscious of the antagonism between them and the elite (Gidron & Mijs, 2019).  
Second, immigrants can drive support for right-wing populist parties. High migration 
rates are hypothesized to lead to a variety of anti-immigration sentiments such as immigration 
skepticism, or less prominently xenophobia and racism (Rydgren, 2008). Such attitudes 
resonate with right-wing populist rhetoric and may drive support for these parties. Moreover, 
literature shows that this is clearly the case with frames that link immigration to criminality, 
social tension, the loss of cultural distinction and national identity. (Cutts et. al., 2011; Rydgren, 
2008).  
 
Exploring the effect of open electoral systems on populist parties 
Lijphart’s idea that open electoral systems offer populist parties more chance to find support 
clearly casts doubt about the explanatory theory that Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) apply. 
However, the rise of populism has not yet been systematically explored in light of electoral 
systems (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; Papadopoulos, 2002). The next part of this study aims to 
do exactly that. However, we want to avoid collinearity with the first hypothesis, because both 
measure institutional factors that drive populist support. Therefore I will select a case that 
ideally does not have a cooperating political culture while simultaneously does have an open 
electoral system. Accordingly, this allows to exclusively test my second hypothesis. 
Thereinafter, I aim to generalize my findings in a cross-national quantitative analysis among 
eighteen Western European countries in order to contrast which hypothesis is a better predictor 
of the size of populism. 
 
Methodology for the qualitative analysis. 
Selecting a case that demonstrates a surprising value by reference to some general 
understanding of a topic fits the ‘deviant-case selection method’. The case is “deviant” in that 
a value is poorly explained by a causal theoretical model. Hence, deviant cases are judged 
relative to some general model of causal relations. The purpose of a deviant case analysis 
usually is to probe for new, but yet unspecified, explanations (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). 
Furthermore, causal processes within the deviant case may illustrate some causal factor that is 
applicable to other (deviant) cases. Moreover, the method has the main advantage of reducing 
the risk of collinearity, because the deviant case is poorly explained by a theoretical model 
(Gerring, 2008). 
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This deviant-case analysis aims to exclusively measure the effect of electoral openness 
on populist support. My database contains two countries that significantly changed its electoral 
system from 1980 to 2017. First, Italy changed its electoral system from list proportional 
representation to mixed member proportional in 1994. In 2005 the electoral system was again 
changed to a system of proportional representation with closed lists that allocates a sizable seat 
“majority bonus” (Passarelli, 2018). Second, France changed its electoral system from 
majority-plurality to proportional representation in 1986 (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). 
 On the one hand, Italy is typified as a consensus democracy2. Moreover, its electoral 
system remained relatively open (Passarelli, 2018). On the other hand, France is characterized 
as a majoritarian democracy. However, its electoral system was changed from a closed to a very 
open one in 1986. Although this lead to a forced cooperation between the Socialist Party and 
the right-wing RPR coalition, French political culture remained very antagonistic. Therefore, 
France provides the best case for my qualitative analysis, because its open electoral system is 
anomalous for the majoritarian model. 
 My second hypothesis will be tested as follows. First, secondary academic literature on 
France from 1981 to 1988 will be used. Second, this period is separated by two consequent 
legislative elections. The goal is to study support for populism before and after France changed 
its electoral system to proportional representation. In this period, the National Front was the 
only significant populist party in France (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). The hypothesis leads to two 
respective expectations that are in figure 4. Support for the National Front will be limited in the 
first period, in which the electoral system was more closed. However, after 1986 we expect the 
emergence of populist support, due to the open electoral system. Finally, the aim of the deviant-
case analysis is to probe for other theoretical explanations that drives populist support. 
 
Figure 4: Expectations on the support for populism in France 1981 - 1988 
 Political culture Electoral system Expectation 
Period 1981-1986 Antagonistic Majoritarian-plurality Few support for 
populism 
Period 1986-1988 Antagonistic Proportional 
representation 
Emergence of 
populism 
 
                                                            
2 Italy scores of 1,13, whereas France scores -0,89 on Lijphart’s executives-parties dimension. The executive-
parties dimension forms a scale from -2 to +2. Whereas a negative score reflects a majoritarian democracy, a 
positive score represents a more consensual democracy (Lijphart, 1999). 
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The Emergence of Front National in France. 
Figure 5 
Parties Vote percentages Seats in parliament 
Socialist Party (PS) 49,3 269 
Rally for the Republic (RPR) 22,4 85 
Union for French 
Democracy (UDF) 
18,7 62 
French Communist Party 
(PCF) 
7 44 
 
France, 1981-1986. 
First, I will evaluate how the majoritarian electoral system influenced support for populism in 
1981. Second, I will discuss the breeding grounds for support of the National Front in the run-
up to the 1986 legislative elections. 
On May 10th 1981, François Mitterrand defeated Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing in the second 
round of the French presidential elections to become the first socialist head of state in the history 
of the Fifth Republic (Christofferson, 1991). One month later, the electorate provided the 
Socialist Party (PS) an absolute majority of 269 seats in the National Assembly, the lower house 
of the French parliament. Therefore the Socialists did not need to cooperate with other parties 
and the political culture between parties remained very antagonistic in this period (Bell & 
Gaffney, 2013). The National Front however, got only 0,36% of the vote in the first round, 
which was not enough to participate in the second round of the legislative elections (Bréchon 
& Mitra, 1992). Two main factors contribute to its bad electoral performance. 
First, with only three weeks to prepare its campaign, the National Front fielded only a 
limited number of candidates. However, literature indicates that other parties experienced 
similar difficulties  (Shields, 2007). Second, the majoritarian electoral system made it very 
difficult for the National Front to find support. Majoritarian electoral systems require parties to 
obtain a majority in an electoral district in order to win seats in parliament. Hence, smaller 
parties will have far more difficulty to emerge (Colomer, 2005). In order to stand a chance 
against other parties, the National Front was forced to focus its campaign to a limited number 
of districts. However, not only did the party fail to win in any electoral district, the limited 
campaign significantly narrowed its appeal to the French electorate (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). 
Thus, the majoritarian electoral system significantly reduced chances for the National Front to 
emerge. 
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Moreover, the French economy experienced over four years of slow growth and an 
increase in unemployment from 7% in 1981 to 10% in October 1985 (Sachs & Wyplosz, 1986). 
Accompanied with rising inflation and a foreign exchange crisis by early 1983, the government 
was forced to introduce a more market oriented program. Nonetheless, the government 
nationalization of several main industries and banks combined with Mitterrand’s economic 
policy resulted in continuous ascending unemployment and an overvalued franc, which 
significantly reduced France’s competitiveness on the international market (Stockemer, 2017; 
Shields, 2007). Hence, many voters were frustrated by the intensity and duration of the 
economic crisis in the early 1980s. Furthermore, the French population became extensively 
sensitive to issues related to migration as it witnessed an increase of immigrants coming from 
North Africa from 2.3% in 1946 to 38.5% in 1982 of the total percentage of immigrants 
(Stockemer, 2017). More people feared that these people would be incapable of adapting to 
French culture (Shields, 2007).  
In anticipation of the 1986 legislative elections, the National Front capitalized on these 
developments by creating a new political image. The party connected problems with 
immigration, on the one hand, and crime and unemployment on the other hand (Stockemer, 
2017). Le Pen’s rhetoric resonated with voters in the older industrial and urbanized areas of 
France, which are to be found on the Mediterranean coast, the Rhône region and a sizable part 
of the region around Paris, Alsace and Moselle (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). These regions contain 
the largest number of immigrants from North Africa and have been most severely affected by 
the economic crisis that has taken place since then, rendering the immigrant workforce of the 
1970s, now seen by some as cheap competitors for French workers. Moreover, these areas show 
high levels of general insecurity, incidence of armed robberies and violent crime (Bréchon & 
Mitra, 1992).  
 
France, 1986-1988. 
In the following part I will first discuss the influence of proportional representation on the 
support for the National Front. Next, I will argue that the French political culture remained 
antagonistic. 
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Figure 6 
Parties Vote percentages Seats in parliament 
Socialist Party (PS) 31 213 
Right-Wing Coalition (RPR-
UDF) 
50,5 290 
French Communist Party 
(PCF) 
9,8 35 
National Front (FN) 9,7 35 
 
In the run-up to the 1986 legislative elections, the successive municipal elections in 
1983 and European elections in 1984 had turned out to be relatively successful for the National 
Front (DeClair & Eward, 1999). However, the emergence of the National Front in the legislative 
elections of 1986 can hardly be explained without the changed electoral system. President 
Mitterrand’s decision to re-establish party-list proportional representation caused political 
outrage from the conservative Rally for the Republic (RPR) who accused Mitterrand of wanting 
to strengthen the FN in order to weaken the Republican Right, which was favorite to win the 
1986 elections according to polls (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). Certainly, scholars point out that 
the proportional representation system was crucial to Le Pen’s electoral success (Bréchon & 
Mitra 1992; DeClair & Edward, 1999). The assertion is supported by two reasons. First, the 
mechanic effect of the electoral system. Second, the psychological effect the system creates. 
The electoral system has a direct effect on the party system, since it establishes how 
votes are translated into parliamentary seats (Sartori, 1999). The mechanical effect of 
proportional representation comprises that, contrary to the majoritarian system, votes are more 
proportionally translated into parliamentary seats. Moreover, a party now does not need a 
majority in an electoral district in order to win seats. This significantly increased the chance 
that National Front deputies could be elected (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). Furthermore, the 
psychological effect of proportional representation stipulates that (smaller) parties can contest 
in more electoral districts because of the mechanical effect. Crucially, the electoral system 
allowed the National Front to campaign outside their core electoral regions. Hence, the party’s 
electoral success not only increased its political visibility and legitimacy, but also allowed the 
build-up of a nationwide organizational structure (Stockemer, 2017). 
In the aftermath of the municipal and the European elections, Le Pen exploited on the 
media attention that the National Front received by announcing a nationwide promotional tour 
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on a television interview program (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992). Le Pen created a niche in the 
electoral arena by pioneering a new potent ‘master frame’ combining ethno-nationalist 
xenophobia with anti-political-establishment populism (Ivaldi, 2014). The spectacular success 
of the National Front surprised both established parties and the media. The party appeared to 
have suddenly shifted from the fringes of politics to become a major player in the French 
partisan system (Bréchon & Mitra, 1992).  
However, Mitterrand’s strategy to change the electoral system could not prevent the 
right-wing coalition  RPR-UDF, led by Jacques Chirac, from obtaining 290 of the 573 seats in 
the National Assembly (Poulard, 1990). The Socialists therefore lost their absolute majority in 
parliament and it forced them to appoint Chirac as Prime Minister. This unprecedented 
experiment came to be known as cohabitation, in which the President and the Prime Minister 
are of different parties. Although expected by many to lead to compelling political controversy, 
it endured until the next presidential elections in 1988 (Poulard, 1990). Yet, the relationship 
between Mitterrand and Chirac was at best distant, often antagonistic and at times tumultuous 
(Bell & Gaffney, 2013). 
 
Conclusions on support for the National Front in France, 1981 - 1988. 
This deviant-case analysis studied how the electoral system affected support for populism in 
France from 1981 to 1988. It shows that the majoritarian system was a main factor for the bad 
electoral performance of the National Front in 1981. However, proportional representation 
provided the party an opportunity to emerge due to the mechanical as well as the psychological 
effect of the electoral system. Moreover, the analysis clearly identifies two latent factors that 
drove support for the National Front. On the one hand, voters were frustrated by the ongoing 
rise of unemployment. On the other hand, this fueled anti-immigration sentiments as they were 
now seen by some as cheap competitors for French laborers. Hence Le Pen’s dogmatic 
character, organizational skills and rhetoric of ethno-nationalist xenophobia combined with 
anti-political-establishment populism created momentum for the National Front (DeClair & 
Edward, 1999). 
 The analysis raises the question whether its findings can be generalized when looked at 
our study objective. This will be the goal of the next part of this study. Henceforward, it aims 
to contrast my first and second hypotheses in order to assess which best explains the size of 
populism in Western Europe from 1980 to 2017.   
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Methodology for the quantitative analysis. 
This section will operationalize the dependent and independent variables. Next, I will test my 
hypotheses by studying the electoral trajectories of populist parties that contested national-level 
legislative elections in eighteen Western European countries from 1980 to 2017. 
 
Figure 7. 
Descriptive Statistics N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Statistic 
 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation 
Total share of 
populism 
224 53 0 53 8,90 0,71 10,69 
Total share of left-
wing populism 
224 25.55 0 25,55 1,05 0,22 3,26 
Total share of right-
wing populism 
224 40 0 40 6,54 0,63 9,38 
Factor Lijphart 224 3,72 -1,95 1,77 40 0,07 1,00 
Logged Average 
District Magnitude 
224 2,18 0 2,18 0,93 0,04 0,62 
Volatility 224 0,66 0,02 0,68 0,14 0,01 0,10 
Unemployment 224 26,70 0,30 27 7,38 0,30 4,51 
Net Migration 224 25.31 -7,18 18,13 2,93 0,25 3,78 
Notes: N= 224.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is operationalized as the total percentage of votes received by populist 
parties in a national legislative election. The analysis will focus on both left-wing as well as 
right-wing populism. In order to determine what parties are populist I use the PopuList database 
by Rooduijn (2019), because he also operationalizes populism along with Mudde’s (2004) 
ideational approach. Moreover, populist parties are considered relevant when it got at least 2% 
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of the total votes in at least one national election (Rooduijn, 2019). The vote share of each party 
is received from the ParlGov database by Döring and Manow (2019). However, some remarks 
need to be made. First, in order to analyze Germany I will use data on Western Germany only 
from 1980 to 1991 because Eastern Germany was no democracy at that time period. Second, 
the PopuList database does not distinguish when certain parties became populist over time. 
Additional literature shows that the following parties are considered populist in the subsequent 
moments in time. Respectively, the Austrian FPÖ in 1987, the Finns Party in 1995 and the 
Swiss SVP-UDC in 1991 (Wodak, 2015; Arter, 2010; Albertazzi, 2008). Figure 1 in the covers 
all populist parties examined in this study. 
 
Independent variables 
● Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension, without electoral disproportionality 
(Factor Lijphart).  
The first hypothesis states that countries that are consensual on the first dimension show higher 
support for populism. Lijphart’s first dimension, which measures the division of power between 
institutions, consists of the following five indicators: the effective number of parliamentary 
parties, minimal winning one-party cabinets, executive dominance, electoral disproportionality 
and interest group pluralism (Lijphart, 2012). However, new scores of the first dimension have 
to be calculated for each country, in which electoral disproportionality is excluded. The logic 
is that electoral disproportionality is also a measurement of electoral openness, and I want to 
the reduce chances of collinearity with the second hypothesis. 
 The new scores of Lijphart’s first dimension can be calculated by matters of a 
confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis is a statistical method used to 
confirm variability among observed, correlated variables in terms of a potentially lower number 
of unobserved (underlying) variables called factors (Field, 2009). It searches for joint variations 
in response to unobserved latent variables. The observed variables are modelled as linear 
combinations of the factors. Confirmatory factor analysis consequently aims to confirm 
independent latent variables (Field, 2009).  
  This study replicates Lijphart’s (1999) factor analysis, but without ‘electoral 
disproportionality’. Each of the nine indicators are drawn from the Lijphart dataset from Eggers 
(2010), which provides the averages of each separate indicator from 1981 to 2010. Although 
the averages do not fully cover the time period 1980-2017, differences are negligible. The 
factors that are found can then be seen as “averages” of the closely related variables, and are 
presented in figure 8 in the appendix (Lijphart, 1999). The values shown for each variable are 
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the factor loadings, which can be interpreted as the correlation coefficients between the variable 
and the first and second factors detected by the factor analysis (Lijphart, 1999). The same two 
clusters emerge prominently from this analysis, matching Lijphart’s first and second dimension. 
Because the factor analysis used an orthogonal rotation the two factors are completely 
uncorrelated. The loadings of the first factor can consequently be used as the independent 
variable ‘Lijphart’s first dimension without electoral disproportionality’. The score ranges from 
-1,95 to 1,77. Whereas a negative score reflects the extent to which a country is consensual, a 
positive score disposes a more majoritarian country. 
● The Logged Average District Magnitude (ADM).  
The second hypothesis stated that countries that have more open electoral systems show higher 
support for populist parties. Scholars assess that the logged measurement of average district 
magnitude is a better parameter of electoral openness (Lowery et. al., 2010). Average district 
magnitudes per country per year are drawn from Golder (2013). Hence, the logged 
measurement of average district magnitude is calculated manually. The variable ranges from 0 
to 2,18. On the one hand, 0 score reflects a country that has very small electoral districts, such 
as the United Kingdom (log(1) = 0). On the other hand, the Netherlands has one large electoral 
district (log(150) = 2,18). Hence, according to the second hypothesis, populist parties can 
emerge easier in countries that have large electoral districts.  
● Electoral Volatility.  
Electoral volatility explains how (new) parties emerge over time (Lago & Martínez, 2011). For 
each election I take the volatility digit from the election before, because this reflects the actual 
volatility on the analyzed election. Electoral volatility of each country per election from 1980 
to 2015 is drawn from Emanuele (2015). The remaining elections are manually calculated by 
adding up the number of votes won by parties plus the number of votes lost by parties, divided 
by two (Pedersen, 1979). 
● Unemployment.  
Unemployment is operationalized as the harmonized unemployment rates. Harmonized 
unemployment rates define the unemployed as people of working age who are without work, 
are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work (OECD, 2019). The uniform 
application of this definition results in unemployment rates that are more internationally 
comparable than estimates based on national definitions. Harmonized unemployment rates are 
drawn from the HUR database (OECD, 2019). For the same reasons given on electoral 
volatility, I take the harmonized unemployment rates from the past election to analyze the 
current election. 
21 
 
● Net Migration Rates (Net Migration).   
The net migration rate is calculated as the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants 
over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over 
that period. It is expressed as average annual net number of migrants per 1,000 population (Ray, 
2017).  
 
Quantitative Analysis 
Now that we have both conceptualized and operationalized the dependent and independent 
variables, I will turn my attention to a broad cross-sectional quantitative analysis to establish 
associations between patterns of democracy, electoral openness and support for populist parties 
in eighteen Western European countries. To maximize the robustness of my dependent and 
independent variables, I will execute 34 combinations of regressions in relation to the dependent 
variable. However, only a limited number will be discussed because they show relevant 
deviance from the main model. Other regression models are in the appendix. 
Model 1 serves as the main model because it shows all independent variables in relation 
to the dependent variable. On the one hand, it shows a highly significant relation between the 
political culture of consensus democracy and the total share of populist parties. The robustness 
check of model 2 confirms this relation. However, on the other hand, the main model implies a 
weak significant negative relation between electoral openness and the size of populist parties. 
This would reflect that more closed electoral systems have larger populist parties. Hence, model 
3 casts doubt about the robustness of this finding as it shows no significant relation when ‘Factor 
Lijphart’ is withdrawn from the regression model. Furthermore, model 4 confirms that electoral 
volatility and net migration are strongly related to the total share of populist parties. 
Model 5 and 6 contain a robustness check of the dependent variable. It measures 
separate relations between the independent variables and left-wing as well as right-wing 
populism. First, model 5 shows a strong significant positive relation between logged average 
district magnitude and left-wing populism. Moreover, unemployment is moderately significant 
related. Second, model 6 reflects a strong significant positive relation between the political 
culture of consensus democracy and right-wing populism. Hence, electoral volatility and net 
migration are significantly related. Altogether, this leads us to the following conclusions. 
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Figure 8. 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Model Total share 
of populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of left-
wing populism 
Total share of 
right-wing 
populism 
Average district 
magnitude 
-2,14* 
(-1,68) 
 0,92 
(0.8) 
 1,39*** 
(3,38) 
-6,07*** 
(-5,47) 
Factor Lijphart -3,86*** 
(-4,77) 
-1,95*** 
(-2,76) 
  0,03 
(0,12) 
 
-3,97*** 
(-5,6) 
Volatility 33,87*** 
(4,76) 
 29,89*** 
(4,06) 
29,51*** 
(4,02) 
3,3 
(1,45) 
18,68*** 
(3,03) 
Unemployment 0,34** 
(2,12) 
 0,16 
(0,95) 
0,13 
(0,82) 
0,11** 
(2,18) 
0,21 
(1,473) 
Net Migration 0,6*** 
(3,12) 
 0,52*** 
(2,72) 
0,49** 
(2,61) 
0,03 
(0,56) 
0,28* 
(1,76) 
Notes: N= 186.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
 
Conclusions on the quantitative analysis. 
At first sight, the cross-sectional quantitative analysis seems to point out that the first hypothesis 
best explains the size of populist parties in Western European countries. Countries that are more 
consensual on the executive-parties dimension indeed show higher support for populist parties 
than countries that are more majoritarian. Furthermore, no robust relation between electoral 
openness and the total share of populist parties could be found. However, when testing the 
robustness of the dependent variable we find a rather complex story that implies two things.   
First, this confirms the statement in the introduction of this study that there is a gap in 
studying populism as such. Although populism manifested itself on both the political right as 
well as on the political left, scholars on populism in Western Europe have mainly focused on 
right-wing populism (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Hakhverdian 
and Koop (2007), who do look at both left-wing as well as right-wing populism, do not 
distinguish between institutional factors that explain the success of the respective sides of the 
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populist spectrum. However, this study finds that left-wing populism and right-wing populism 
seem to be distinct phenomena that have very different explanations for their relative success. 
This not only corroborates with recent research, but stresses the importance of including both 
sides of the political spectrum in further research on populism (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). Second, 
left-wing populist parties seem to emerge like other political parties: more open electoral 
systems provides them a bigger chance to get elected. Hence, the political culture of consensus 
democracy seems to make a difference for right-wing populist parties. I now turn to the 
conclusions of this study which discusses how the qualitative and quantitative research relate. 
 
Conclusions on the emergence of populist parties in contemporary Western Europe. 
Over the course of past decades, scholars have paid increasing attention to populism and 
populist parties in Western Europe. This is mainly due to its recent electoral success, as well as 
its complicated and ambivalent relationship with democracy. This study set out to explore the 
impact of institutional arrangements on the performance of both left-wing, as well as right-wing 
populist parties in eighteen Western European countries from 1980 to 2017. The theoretical 
debate between Andeweg (2001) and Lijphart (2001) suggested two respective explanations, 
based on which I formulated two hypotheses. 
 First, it was hypothesized that countries that are more consensual on the executive-
parties dimension show higher support for populist parties. Theory suggested that the inherent 
political culture of cooperating political elites in homogeneous societies would lead to the 
emergence of populist parties. The second hypothesis stated that countries that have more open 
electoral systems show higher support for populist parties. This is based on the idea that populist 
parties, like any other party, can get elected more easily in open electoral systems.  
However, as the relation between populist parties and electoral systems has not yet been 
systematically explored, a qualitative research on France between 1981 and 1988 was 
conducted. Consequently, it examined that the establishment of the proportional electoral 
system in 1986 was crucial to the emergence of the National Front. Whereas the mechanical 
effect of the electoral system provided the party a bigger opportunity to obtain seats, this 
allowed for a nationwide campaign which significantly boosted both the party’s as well as Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s image and legitimacy to the public. Moreover, France never had a political 
culture of cooperation. Even in cohabitation politics remained very antagonistic.  
Yet, the case of the National Front seems to be anomalous. The quantitative analysis 
implies a rather complex story. It indicated that both hypotheses have their respective 
explanatory value in relation to the support for populist parties. Theories of both hypotheses 
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seem to be good predictors of support for populism for each respective side of the political 
spectrum. 
Crucially, this study indicates that there is a gap in studying populism as such. It strongly 
supports the idea that right-wing and left-wing populism seem to be two distinct phenomena, 
that have very different theoretical explanations for their relative success. On the one hand, this 
study reveals that Andeweg’s (2001) theory about the political culture of consensus democracy 
is a strong predictor of support for right-wing populist parties. On the other hand, it illustrates 
that Lijphart’s (2001) theory on electoral openness is a robust predictor of support for left-wing 
populist parties.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 9. 
Variable Factor I Factor II 
Effective number of parliamentary parties -,859  
Minimal winning one-party cabinets ,889  
Executive dominance ,779  
Electoral disproportionality ,843  
Interest group pluralism ,794  
Federalism-decentralization  ,947 
Bicameralism  ,837 
Constitutional rigidity  ,837 
Judicial review  ,677 
Central bank independence  ,757 
Note: The factor analysis is a principal components analysis with eigenvalues over 1.0 extracted. 
 
Figure 10. 
No. 7 8 9 10 11 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Logged Average 
District Magnitude 
-2,67** 
(-2,08) 
-2,67** 
(-2,07) 
-2,58* 
(-1,91) 
-2,22* 
(-1,73) 
-2,26* 
(-1,66) 
Factor Lijphart -3,72*** 
(-4,51) 
-3,46*** 
(-4,31) 
-2,8*** 
(-3,37) 
-3,45*** 
(-4,35) 
-2,75*** 
(-3,33) 
Volatility 31.98*** 
(4,46) 
34,12*** 
(4,87) 
 36,58*** 
(5,24) 
 
Unemployment 0,21 
(1,32) 
    
Net Migration    0,47** 
(2,62) 
0,34* 
(1,83) 
Notes: N= 186.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
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Figure 11. 
No. 12 13 14 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Logged Average District 
Magnitude 
   
Factor Lijphart    
Volatility 28,39*** 
(3,83) 
31*** 
(4,37) 
 
Unemployment 0,03 
(0,21) 
 0,2 
(1,26) 
Net Migration  0,46** 
(2,49) 
 
Notes: N= 186.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
 
Figure 12. 
No. 15 16 17 18 19 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Logged Average 
District Magnitude 
-2,13 
(-1,6) 
-2,61* 
(-1,95) 
-0,14 
(-0,12) 
-2,58* 
(-1,91) 
 
Factor Lijphart -3,43*** 
(-4,07) 
-3,33*** 
(-3,9) 
 -2,8*** 
(-3,37) 
-2,75*** 
(-3,76) 
Volatility      
Unemployment 0,50*** 
(2,98) 
0,37** 
(2,29) 
  0,51*** 
(3,02) 
Net Migration 0,5*** 
(2,63) 
   0,54*** 
(2,87) 
Notes: N= 186.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
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Figure 13. 
No. 20 21 22 23 24 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Average District 
Magnitude 
   0,33 
(0,29) 
 
Factor Lijphart     -2,46*** 
(-3,35) 
Volatility   28,82*** 
(4,04) 
28,5*** 
(3,83) 
 
Unemployment 0,3* 
(1,82) 
  0,04 
(0,25) 
0,37** 
(2,26) 
Net Migration 0,45** 
(2,3) 
0,36* 
(1,9) 
   
 
Figure 14. 
No. 25 26 27 28 29 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Average District 
Magnitude 
0,29 
(1,13) 
0,72 
(0,64) 
0,17 
(0,14) 
0,62 
(0,52) 
0,1 
(0,09) 
Factor Lijphart      
Volatility 28,99*** 
(4,04) 
31,51*** 
(4,41) 
   
Unemployment    0,31* 
(1,88) 
0,2 
(1,25) 
Net Migration  0,47** 
(2,56) 
0,36* 
(1,89) 
0,47* 
(2,36) 
 
Notes: N= 224.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
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Figure 15. 
No. 30 31 32 33 34 
Model Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Total share of 
populism 
Logged Average 
District Magnitude 
     
Factor Lijphart -3,18*** 
(-4,52) 
-2,83*** 
(-3,98) 
-2,58*** 
(-3,76 
-2,72*** 
(-4,02) 
-2,01*** 
(-2,87) 
Volatility 33,6*** 
(4,74) 
31,81*** 
(4,4) 
33,93*** 
(4,81) 
36,64*** 
(5,23) 
 
Unemployment 0,35** 
(2,16) 
0,21 
(1,3) 
   
Net Migration 0,61*** 
(3,35) 
  0,51*** 
(2,86) 
0,38** 
(2,06) 
Notes: N= 224.  
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1 
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